China and COVID-19: a shock to its economy, a metaphor for its development by Magnus, George
GEORGE MAGNUS
STRATEGIC UPDATE
FEBRUARY 2020
China and COVID-19: 
 a shock to its economy, 
a metaphor for its development
Ranked #1 university affiliated think tank in the 
world in the 2019 Global Go To Think Tank Index.
LSE IDEAS is LSE’s foreign policy think tank.  
We connect academic knowledge of diplomacy and 
strategy with the people who use it. 
 
Through sustained engagement with policymakers 
and opinion-formers, IDEAS provides a forum that 
informs policy debate and connects academic 
research with the practice of diplomacy and strategy.
IDEAS hosts interdisciplinary research projects, 
produces working papers and reports, holds public 
and off-the-record events, and delivers cutting-edge 
executive training programmes for government, 
business and third-sector organisations.
lseideas lseideas
GEORGE MAGNUS
China and COVID-19:   
a shock to its economy,  
a metaphor for its development
President Xi Jinping has vowed to wage a ‘people’s 
war’ against the COVID-19 epidemic. Judging by the 
draconian measures that have been introduced to 
quarantine tens of millions of people, restrict the return 
to work after the Chinese New Year, and shutter much of 
the Chinese economy, he was certainly not understating 
his determination. 
Yet, while this is unquestionably a serious public health 
issue, there are at least three other important issues 
related to it. The first is the dire consequences of the 
government’s containment measures for the economy, at 
least in the early part of 2020. Second, the government’s 
conduct unveils significant features about governance in 
Xi’s China that can be mapped on to China’s development. 
Third, this crisis is almost certainly the biggest challenge 
that Xi Jinping has faced since coming to power in 2012. 
He will survive it and feel emboldened to continue with 
the contours of governance he has asserted. Yet this will 
likely prove to be incompatible with China’s economic 
development goals.
.... this crisis is 
almost certainly 
the biggest 
challenge that Xi 
Jinping has faced 
since coming to 
power in 2012
‘‘
‘‘
LSE IDEAS Strategic Update   |  February 20204
I. Economy in the cross-hairs
In a Strategic Update on China’s prospects 
in the 2020s last September, I explained 
how China’s past performance could not be 
extrapolated into the future and that it was 
facing a number of structural headwinds. 
These comprise over-indebtedness and 
a more limited capacity to carry and 
service debt, deteriorating prospects for 
employment creation, poor demographics 
or, put simply, the consequences of rapid 
ageing, a looming middle income trap and 
a hostile external environment, in particular 
the many facets of the so-called trade war 
with the United States.1
According to data sourced to Wind 
Information, provinces accounting for close 
to 80 per cent of China’s GDP and 90 per cent 
of its exports extended the normal Chinese 
new year holiday shutdown to 10 February.2 
In the run-up to that date and subsequently, 
the flow of workers returning to work has 
been slow, with many either fearful or 
restricted from doing so. The government 
clearly wants them to return to normal life 
as soon as possible, but the reality is that 
many firms, shops, and transportation 
systems are continuing to operate health 
checks and controls that prevent or limit 
the extent to which workers and visitors can 
resume normal functions.
The main sector buffeted by the clampdown 
measures is services, including for example, 
travel, tourism, restaurants, entertainment 
and retail outlets. These are sites or 
environments in which the concentration 
of people is very high. Yet small businesses 
have been hit hard, too. Suppliers of 
components, and even large industrial 
enterprises, such as those involved in 
automobile manufacturing, oil and gas, 
coal and steel, and chemicals, have all 
succumbed to production delays, cutbacks 
or closures, and rising levels of inventories 
because their sales have slumped. 
Remember that even before all of these 
latest shocks, banks were already 
experiencing stress from rising levels of non-
performing loans, a weakening economy, 
and the cumulative effects of de-risking. 
Now many of their corporate and household 
customers will be experiencing additional 
cash flow problems and income shortfalls, 
respectively. Private firms, moreover, which 
had been experiencing more difficult 
conditions in the wake of the government’s 
policies to favour and champion state 
enterprises and push the party’s influence 
into the operational management of private 
as well as state firms, will almost certainly 
be feeling the brunt of the measures to 
curtail the infection. 
This all begs the question as to how bad 
the economic situation might become? In 
this regard most economists are guessing, 
it is fair to say, aided and abetted by a 
wealth of bottom-up data from which we 
can deduce certain trends in transportation 
volumes, sales in certain sectors, the use of 
electricity, and imports and prices of oil and 
copper, for example. These suggest to most 
forecasters that the effects so far have 
been quite severe. 
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Whither growth?
A recent survey of economists by Bloomberg 
suggested that first quarter GDP growth 
would drop from 6 per cent at the end of 
2019 to about 4-4.5 per cent, but a few were 
well below 4 per cent.3 Bear in mind, though, 
that many economists doubt the official 
estimates of China’s economic growth, with 
several private forecasters estimating that 
China’s actual economic growth before the 
coronavirus may have been much closer 
to 5 than to 6 per cent, and perhaps even a 
little below that. 
If 4.5 per cent in the year to the first quarter 
proves to be what the government says, the 
implication would be that there had been no 
growth at all in China in the March quarter. 
That itself would be remarkable. Yet, an 
abundance of anecdote suggests that the 
impact of the shutdowns and quarantines 
will have been a fall in output and spending, 
which would be close to what we would 
have to call at least a technical recession 
in China, depending on what happens in the 
June quarter. If the economy contracted by 
1 per cent, or an annual rate of 4 per cent, 
the more commonly cited annual growth 
rate would have dropped to 3.5 per cent. The 
maths then follow: a 2 per cent fall or 8 per 
cent annualised drop means annual growth 
falls to 2.5 per cent, and so on. 
These are then extraordinary times for 
Beijing’s policymakers and party leaders. 
Quite whether the government can bring 
itself to reveal the true sense of economic 
loss is a moot point. The suspicion is that 
it won’t. The Communist Party’s pledge to 
double GDP and income per head in the 
decade to 2020 is now on the cusp. Hitting 
these targets requires GDP to grow by about 
5.8 per cent in real terms in 2020, and this 
might only happen if the infection stabilises 
soon and economic life normalises in an 
orderly and steady fashion after March. 
If the growth target for this year is not met, 
and the pledge is unfulfilled, it would not be a 
political disaster for Beijing, but there would 
certainly be some reputational damage 
to add to other sources of pushback and 
disquiet that have been building up over 
the last 18 months or so, now including the 
mishandling of the coronavirus prevention 
and containment.
Normally we would have expected the party 
to announce its growth target and strategy 
for 2020 at the ‘two sessions’ meetings—of 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference, and the National People’s 
Congress—in early March. These key 
meetings have, however, been postponed, 
following state media announcements that 
Beijing will remain subject to travel and 
other restrictions for much longer. It was 
reported on 14 February that everyone 
returning to Beijing would have to go into 
quarantine for 14 days or risk punishment in 
order to help contain the coronavirus.4 The 
government has so far only taken the unusual 
step of revealing that in 3 normally highly 
secretive Politburo Standing Committee 
meetings in the last few weeks President Xi 
insisted that the COVID-19 outbreak should 
not stop China from achieving its economic 
and social goals.5 
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To date, the government has been restrained 
in trying to offset the economic effects of the 
virus containment measures, partly because 
its focus is elsewhere, and significantly, one 
imagines, because stimulus measures can 
hardly have traction if people won’t go out 
and workers can’t work.  Nevertheless, the 
authorities have not been inactive.
The People’s Bank of China has injected 
several hundred billion dollars of liquidity 
to try and keep the financial system stable, 
and ensure orderly funding to other financial 
institutions and to many borrowers. The 
‘usual suspects’ of lower interest rates, 
cuts in reserve requirements, targeted 
lending instructions, and the use of window 
guidance for lending are all likely to be 
deployed. New forms of fiscal easing, and 
more infrastructure spending are also 
likely policy responses in due course. Local 
governments have also been authorised 
to front-load spending for this year, and 
borrow accordingly. 
By mid February, issuance of bonds had 
already surpassed that for the whole of 
the year-ago month, and the Ministry of 
Finance again increased the quota for 
local government bond issuance in the 
early part of 2020. It is also likely that the 
government will allow the Yuan to weaken, 
even at the risk of causing some angst for 
its US counterpart, which will doubtless 
be scrutinising China’s compliance with 
the terms of the phase one trade deal, 
concluded only last month.
Ultimately, everything depends on how long 
it takes for the authorities to control and 
stabilise the spread of infection, enabling 
it to lift restrictions and allow economic 
life to normalise. Yet, we would normally 
expect a public health crisis such as this to 
have only a temporary impact on demand 
in the economy, even if it turned out to be 
severe. Once people return to work, retail 
outlets reopen, and construction and 
production resume, spending and lending 
will resume as well. The veil that has lifted 
over China’s governance structure, on the 
other hand, has more enduring and perhaps 
significant implications.
 
II. Lifting the veil on governance
The government’s craving for secrecy, 
stability and control, especially in the 40 
or so days before President Xi went on 
full alert, and then its determined and 
draconian measures to combat the spread 
of infection are in some ways a metaphor 
for thinking about China’s economic 
development prospects.
In assessing the non-economic issues in 
the short timeline of COVID-19, two things 
stand out. First, it certainly appears that 
in the early days of this crisis, there was a 
systematic attempt to suppress and control 
information, including medical information 
and advice, which several doctors in Wuhan 
tried to share amongst themselves. Second, 
once the scale of the problem was allowed 
to filter up to the top of the government, its 
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response couldn’t have been more forceful 
if the threat had been about national 
security at the highest level. It was as if the 
government had been compelled to bring 
the full force of the state to bear on an 
existential threat. 
However the most striking recent revelation 
is that President Xi Jinping addressed 
the Politburo Standing committee on the 
looming epidemic as early as 7 January, 
two weeks before he went on the offensive 
against the virus, and while Wuhan 
authorities were still turning a blind eye to 
it.6 It is a matter of conjecture as to what 
the government itself knew on 7 January 
and for how long before that, but it was 
predictable that Beijing’s current—and very 
traditional—strategy was to hold the local 
party authorities responsible and present 
itself as the agent of reassurance and 
heroism on the people’s behalf.
Not everyone will have been thus placated. 
Indeed, after the sad death in early February 
of Dr. Li Wenliang—one of the Wuhan doctors 
who had been silenced and sanctioned for 
trying to share medical information with 
colleagues—an unusual torrent of dissent 
and anger among citizens erupted on 
social media, posing perhaps the biggest 
governance and trust challenge to Xi Jinping 
since he came to power.
Moreover, a tireless critic of Beijing, 
Professor Xu Zhangrun, who had been 
suspended from his Tsinghua University 
academic post last year, recently wrote 
a long essay in which he charged that the 
epidemic had revealed ‘the rotten core of 
Chinese governance’.7 What Xu lamented 
was the suppression of China’s technocratic 
system by a new tyranny which, in the 
absence of checks and balances, produces 
rule by a clique of trusted lieutenants who 
are beholden to their leader. He was quite 
right to say so, but as a result he has been 
banned from social media and, according to 
friends, has become uncontactable.8
 
Economic development implications
This is the perfect segue into a deeper look 
at China’s forceful but brittle governance 
system—which Xu believes is in a state of 
terminal decay—and its interaction with 
China’s economic development.  For once 
you get to a certain stage of development, 
typically as a middle-income country which 
China is, the role of enabling institutions 
and robust governance becomes 
increasingly significant.
Whether or not Xu is right about ‘terminal’, 
the consequences of a more authoritarian, 
ideological and controlling governance 
structure can already be seen. These exist in 
the stall in structural economic reforms and 
the debt dependency of the economy, the 
flagging state of private sector enterprises, 
which have been the engine of China’s 
economic miracle historically, insecurity 
about what are in any case limited property 
rights, and a general lack of confidence in 
the spending patterns of private individuals 
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and firms. Many foreign firms that have been 
moving parts of their supply chain operations 
outside China or who are considering such a 
move will certainly not have been dissuaded 
from the appropriateness of their strategy 
by recent developments. 
There is a lively debate about the case for 
authoritarian governance to propel economic 
development in a poor country that needs to 
deploy physical labour, and mobilise savings 
and capital to industrialise. While China 
under Mao is remembered for appalling 
economic and political catastrophes, it 
was not devoid of economic, social and 
educational achievements. Yet it was under 
Deng Xiaoping, who came to power in 1978, 
that China truly began to change. Economic 
development after the Mao era was spurred 
by the party becoming much more pragmatic 
as Deng pursued the strategy of ‘reform 
and opening up’, grand experiment that 
entailed the grafting of market mechanisms 
onto the state system, the pursuit of 
privatisation, entrepreneurship, certain 
property rights, and more.
By about 2010, China’s development model 
was in need of a reboot and a renewed 
commitment to ‘reform and opening up’. 
When President Xi Jinping came to power 
in 2012, though, he quickly orchestrated 
a political switch back to a Mao-era 
sort of governance model and ideology 
that revolves around a high degree of 
centralisation of personal and party power 
and authoritarian control, a relentless anti-
corruption campaign and political purge, 
and the return of what Xu calls ‘Red Culture’. 
At the National People’s Congress in 2017, 
Xi told delegates ‘Government, the military, 
society and schools north, south, east and 
west—the party leads them all’. He has 
not flinched from policies and practices 
designed to demonstrate this in shaping 
political and institutional arrangements 
across government, the economy, finance, 
education, culture, the media and elsewhere. 
 
III. Xi in Crisis
The burning question now is whether the 
centralisation of power and authority, 
the obsession with stability and control, 
and the stifling of dissent and debate are 
compromising a more sophisticated China’s 
development potential. 
The coronavirus epidemic management 
has revealed all three phenomena. To be 
fair, it also revealed a still forceful response, 
which perhaps few if any countries could 
emulate. Yet, that response reflects a 
flawed governance system, which is 
simultaneously the effect and cause of the 
public health scare. Arguably, the draconian 
response was necessary only because 
the same governance system capable of 
delivering it was also at fault for causing the 
crisis in the first place. 
Instead of containing and suppressing 
the virus outbreak in the first month or 
so, the authorities were more concerned 
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to shut down essential information and debate, and 
threaten those deemed to be passing on ‘unauthorised 
information’. There was no role for the media, civil 
society institutions, public feedback or personal initiative 
because Xi Jinping has pretty much outlawed them.   
This has been about a current, major public health 
scare. In the past, similar governance failures have been 
perhaps rather less personalised but no less real, and 
included health scares, food and public safety issues, 
economic performance and institutional obstacles 
to better economic management, including as they 
pertained to the made-in-China financial crisis of 2015-
16. Moreover, several academics and intellectuals 
in China have charged that governance failures also 
lie at or close to the heart of several foreign policy 
misjudgements, including the miscalculations over the 
trade war with the United States, the misjudgements 
over the Hong Kong protests, the ‘loss’ of Taiwan to a 
more independently-minded Tsai Ing-Wen presidency in 
the recent elections, and its positioning regarding several 
Belt and Road countries. 
To western-trained eyes, the weaknesses of China’s 
governance system seem obvious. As a modern, 
industrialised and increasingly information-driven state, 
China’s growth and dynamism in the future should be 
increasingly determined not by top-down diktat, directives 
and quantitative targets, but by more flexible institutional 
arrangements that nurture and encourage productivity, 
efficiency, and, importantly, personal responsibility 
and initiative. In complex, information-driven societies, 
in which we strive for the continuous application of 
advanced technologies across multiple economic 
sectors, and independent, accountable and professional 
regulation, the urge to control and suppress information 
or knowledge is highly likely to retard development.
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Yet, there is little to no chance that Xi’s China will change 
tack following the shock of COVID-19. On the contrary, 
if anything, Xi seems more likely to double down, and 
demonstrate to Chinese citizens how important his and 
the party’s remedial actions were and that the people’s 
support for the party will always be rewarded. After 
several days of absence from TV and media coverage, 
the President re-emerged recently, with state media 
outlet Xinhua describing him, as the ‘commander of the 
people’s war against the epidemic’.9
Notwithstanding the broad and passionate outpouring of 
grief and anger about Dr. Li’s death and the mishandling 
of the epidemic, Chinese politics are not about to be 
upended. Yet, this is not the first governance failure China 
has endured, and it won’t be the last. Trust is a commodity 
that can sometimes be resilient to loss, until it isn’t. For 
many, the doubling of income per head in 2020 may or 
may not happen, and will likely be below the radar. But if 
China were to finally lapse into a proper recession for the 
first time or the economic model were to falter in terms 
of job creation, the brittleness of the governance system 
would likely become a more contentious matter. 
For now, the governance structure that has planted deep 
roots under Xi is existential to the party. In the coming 
years of economic development, it is also likely to be its 
antithesis. This is the biggest contradiction confronting 
China and President Xi.  
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The Chinese government’s draconian actions to 
control the coronavirus seem to be producing a 
remarkable economic contraction. As so many are 
unable to attend or resume work at the moment, the 
government’s palliative economic measures may gain 
little traction. Although the demand shock will eventually 
fade, other longer-term issues will surely endure. 
The supply shock will be less obvious but more 
corrosive. The government’s questionable conduct 
in managing the public health crisis has unveiled 
significant features about governance in Xi’s China 
that can be mapped on to China’s development. While 
this crisis is the biggest challenge Xi has faced, there 
is little doubt that he will survive it, champion the 
party’s role in the nation’s rescue, and feel emboldened 
to continue with his authoritarian governance. Yet it 
is this that, in the long run, will prove incompatible 
with China’s economic development ambitions. 
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